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CBO
Estimated Impact of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from 
April 2011 Through June 2011
In February 2009, in response to significant weakness 
in the economy, lawmakers enacted the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The legislation’s 
numerous spending and revenue provisions can be 
grouped into several categories according to their focus:
  Providing funds to states and localities—for example, 
by raising federal matching rates under Medicaid, 
providing aid for education, and increasing financial 
support for some transportation projects;
  Supporting people in need—such as by extending and 
expanding unemployment benefits and increasing 
benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (formerly the Food Stamp program);
  Purchasing goods and services—for instance, by fund-
ing construction and other investment activities that 
could take several years to complete; and
  Providing temporary tax relief for individuals and 
businesses—such as by raising exemption amounts for 
the alternative minimum tax, adding a new Making 
Work Pay tax credit, and creating enhanced deduc-
tions for depreciation of business equipment.
When ARRA was being considered, the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimated that it would increase budget 
deficits by $787 billion between fiscal years 2009 and 
2019. CBO now estimates that the total impact over the 
2009–2019 period will amount to about $825 billion. By 
CBO’s estimate, close to half of that impact occurred in 
fiscal year 2010, and about 85 percent of ARRA’s budget-
ary impact was realized by the end of June 2011.
Various recipients of ARRA funds (most recipients of 
grants and loans, contractors, and subcontractors) are 
required to report, after the end of each calendar quarter, 
the number of jobs funded through ARRA. The law also 
requires CBO to comment on those reported numbers.1
During the second quarter of calendar year 2011, accord-
ing to recipients’ reports, ARRA funded more than 
550,000 full-time-equivalent (FTE) jobs.2 Those reports, 
however, do not provide a comprehensive estimate of the 
law’s impact on U.S. employment, which could be higher 
or lower than the number of FTE jobs reported, for sev-
eral reasons (in addition to any issues concerning the 
quality of the reports’ data).3 First, some of the jobs 
1. Public Law 111-5, sections 1512(c) and 1512(e); 123 Stat. 115, 
288. This report is the eighth in CBO’s series of quarterly reports. 
For the previous report, see Congressional Budget Office, 
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on 
Employment and Economic Output from January 2011 Through 
March 2011 (May 2011). 
2. Data compiled from recipients’ reports (on jobs funded and other 
information) are shown at www.recovery.gov. Recipients were 
asked to calculate FTEs by taking the total number of hours 
worked in a quarter that were funded by ARRA and dividing the 
total by the number of hours that a full-time employee would 
have worked in that quarter.
3. For a discussion of data quality, see Government Accountability 
Office, Recovery Act: Opportunities to Improve Management and 
Strengthen Accountability over States’ and Localities’ Uses of Funds, 
GAO-10-999 (September 2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10999.pdf. 
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included in the reports might have existed even without 
the stimulus package, with employees working on the 
same activities or other activities. Second, the reports 
cover employers that received ARRA funding directly and 
those employers’ immediate subcontractors (the so-called 
primary and secondary recipients of ARRA funding) but 
not lower-level subcontractors. Third, the reports do not 
attempt to measure the number of jobs that were created 
or retained indirectly as a result of recipients’ increased 
income, and the increased income of their employees, 
which could boost demand for other products and ser-
vices as they spent their paychecks. Fourth, the recipients’ 
reports cover only certain ARRA appropriations, which 
encompass about one-fifth of the total either spent by the 
government or conveyed through tax reductions in 
ARRA; the reports do not measure the effects of other 
provisions of the stimulus package, such as tax cuts and 
transfer payments (including unemployment insurance 
payments) to individual people. 
Estimating the law’s overall effects on employment 
requires a more comprehensive analysis than can be 
achieved by using the recipients’ reports. Therefore, look-
ing at recorded spending to date along with estimates of 
the other effects of ARRA on spending and revenues, 
CBO has estimated the law’s impact on employment 
and economic output using evidence about the effects 
of previous similar policies and drawing on various math-
ematical models that represent the workings of the econ-
omy. On that basis, CBO estimates that ARRA’s policies 
had the following effects in the second quarter 
of calendar year 2011 compared with what would have 
occurred otherwise:
  They raised real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic 
product (GDP) by between 0.8 percent and 
2.5 percent, 
  Lowered the unemployment rate by between 
0.5 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points,
  Increased the number of people employed by between 
1.0 million and 2.9 million, and
  Increased the number of full-time-equivalent jobs by 
1.4 million to 4.0 million, as shown in Table 1. 
(Increases in FTE jobs include shifts from part-time to 
full-time work or overtime and are thus generally 
larger than increases in the number of employed 
workers.) 
The effects of ARRA on output peaked in the first half 
of 2010 and have since diminished, CBO estimates. 
The effects of ARRA on employment and unemployment 
are estimated to lag slightly behind the effects on output; 
CBO estimates that the employment effects began to 
wane at the end of 2010 and continued to do so in the 
second quarter of 2011. Still, CBO estimates that, com-
pared with what would have occurred otherwise, ARRA 
will raise real GDP in 2012 by between 0.3 percent 
and 0.8 percent and will increase the number of people 
employed in 2012 by between 0.4 million and 
1.1 million. 
CBO’s current estimates reflect small revisions to its pre-
vious projections of the timing and magnitude of changes 
to federal revenues and spending under ARRA. 
Although CBO has examined data on output and 
employment during the period since ARRA’s enactment, 
those data are not as helpful in determining ARRA’s eco-
nomic effects as might be supposed because isolating the 
effects would require knowing what path the economy 
would have taken in the absence of the law. Because that 
path cannot be observed, the new data add only limited 
information about ARRA’s impact. (For a list of recent 
research that analyzes the economic effects of ARRA, see 
the appendix.) 
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Recipients’ Reports
ARRA requires primary and secondary recipients of more 
than $25,000 from appropriations made under the law to 
report a variety of information each calendar quarter. 
That group includes most grant and loan recipients, con-
tractors, and subcontractors, but it excludes individual 
people. The information to be submitted includes the 
amount of funding received and spent; the name, 
description, and completion status of the project or 
activity funded; the number of jobs funded; and, for 
investments in infrastructure, the purpose and cost of 
the investment. Recipients who filed second-quarter 
reports in July 2011 reported the number of jobs on 
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Table 1.
Estimated Macroeconomic Impact of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 2009 to 2012
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Note: * = Between -0.05 and 0.05.
a. A year of full-time-equivalent employment is 40 hours of employment per week for one year.
the basis of the number of employee hours paid for 
with ARRA funds in the quarter.4
According to those reports, 550,621 full-time-equivalent 
jobs were funded by ARRA during the second quarter.5 
However, the reported number of jobs funded is not a 
comprehensive measure of ARRA’s effect on overall 
Q1 0.1 0.1 * * * * * 0.1
Q2 0.8 1.4 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7
Q3 1.2 2.5 -0.3 -0.6 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.7
Q4 1.5 3.4 -0.5 -1.1 0.9 1.9 1.4 2.8
Q1 1.8 4.4 -0.7 -1.5 1.3 2.8 1.8 4.0
Q2 1.7 4.6 -0.8 -1.9 1.4 3.4 2.0 4.9
Q3 1.4 4.1 -0.8 -2.0 1.4 3.6 2.0 5.2
Q4 1.1 3.5 -0.7 -1.9 1.3 3.5 1.8 5.0
Q1 1.1 3.2 -0.6 -1.8 1.2 3.3 1.6 4.7
Q2 0.8 2.5 -0.5 -1.6 1.0 2.9 1.4 4.0
Q3 0.7 2.1 -0.5 -1.3 0.8 2.5 1.1 3.4
Q4 0.4 1.4 -0.3 -1.1 0.6 2.0 0.8 2.6
Q1 0.3 1.0 -0.3 -0.8 0.5 1.5 0.6 2.0
Q2 0.3 0.9 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.4
Q3 0.3 0.7 -0.2 -0.5 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.1
Q4 0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8
2009 0.9 1.9 -0.3 -0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 1.3
2010 1.5 4.2 -0.7 -1.8 1.3 3.3 1.9 4.8
2011 0.8 2.3 -0.5 -1.4 0.9 2.7 1.2 3.7
2012 0.3 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 0.4 1.1 0.4 1.3
2010 (Calendar Year Quarter)
2011 (Calendar Year Quarter)
2012 (Calendar Year Quarter)
Calendar Year Average
Change Attributable to ARRA
Real Gross Domestic Unemployment Rate Employment Full-Time-Equivalent
Product (Percent) (Percentage points) (Millions of people)  Employment (Millions)a
Low High
Estimate
Low High Low High
2009 (Calendar Year Quarter)
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Low High
4. Specifically, recipients were instructed to calculate the number 
of FTE jobs funded through ARRA by counting the total number 
of hours worked that were funded by ARRA during the second 
quarter, divided by the number of hours in a full-time schedule for 
a quarter. For details and examples, see Office of Management and 
Budget, “Recovery FAQs for Federal Contractors on Reporting,” 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/recovery_faqs_contractors/#report15.
5. For the number of jobs by agency, see “Top Agencies, as Reported 
by Recipients (Apr 1–June 30, 2011),” www.recovery.gov/Pages/
TextView.aspx?data=jobSummaryAgency&topnumber=
200&qtr=2011Q2.
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employment, or even of those provisions of ARRA for 
which recipients’ reports are required. The actual impact 
could, in principle, be significantly larger or smaller than 
the number of jobs reported. 
If, for example, recipients’ reports include employment 
that would have occurred without ARRA, the impact on 
employment suggested by the reports could be too great. 
Some people whose employment was attributed to ARRA 
might have worked on other activities in the absence of 
the law—for example, a business might have bid on 
other projects if its resources had not been committed to 
projects funded by ARRA. In the case of government 
employees, state or local taxes might have been raised in 
the absence of ARRA funding (or transfer payments 
might have been reduced) to pay for some of the jobs that 
were counted as funded by ARRA. 
Conversely, the reported figure could be too low because 
the reporting requirement is limited to primary and 
secondary recipients of funds and thus excludes lower-
level recipients, such as subcontractors hired by a main 
subcontractor. Thus, if expenditures under ARRA led 
to increases in employment among lower-level sub-
contractors and vendors, those effects would be missed 
by the reports. 
Recipients’ reports also do not include indirect effects 
that could increase or decrease the impact on employ-
ment. Among those effects are potential declines in 
employment in other businesses or economic sectors as 
demand shifts toward the recipients of ARRA funding—a 
phenomenon often called the “crowding out” effect of 
government policies. Conversely, spending under ARRA 
could lead to higher employment at companies that are 
not directly connected to that spending—for example, 
because of additional purchases made by people who 
would be unemployed were it not for ARRA funds. 
CBO estimates that, under current conditions, the posi-
tive indirect effects outweigh the negative indirect effects. 
Taken together, in CBO’s estimation, ARRA’s indirect 
effects boost the law’s impact on economic output and 
employment. 
Finally, the recipients’ reports reflect only about one-fifth 
of the total amount of spending increases or tax reduc-
tions that are attributable to ARRA’s provisions. The 
reports cover direct government purchases of goods and 
services, grants and loans to private entities, and some 
grants to states and localities, but they do not cover tax 
cuts or increases in transfer payments to individuals. The 
tax reductions and spending that are not covered by the 
recipients’ reports probably had substantial effects on 
purchases of goods and services and, therefore, on 
employment.
Measuring ARRA’s Impact Using 
Economic Models and Historical Data
CBO used various economic models and historical 
data to guide its estimate of the way in which output 
and employment are affected by increases in outlays 
and reductions in revenues under ARRA. CBO’s 
assessment is that different elements of ARRA (such 
as particular types of tax cuts, transfer payments, and 
government purchases) have had different effects on 
economic output per dollar of higher spending or lower 
tax receipts. Multiplying estimates of those per-dollar 
effects by the dollar amounts of each element of ARRA 
yields an estimate of the law’s total impact on output. To 
produce estimates of ARRA’s total impact on employ-
ment, CBO combined that estimate with estimates of 
how changes in output affect the unemployment rate and 
participation in the labor force.
CBO’s Modeling Approach
CBO used evidence from models and historical relation-
ships to determine estimated “multipliers” for each of 
several categories of spending and tax provisions in 
ARRA, as shown in Table 2. Each multiplier represents 
the estimated direct and indirect effects on the nation’s 
output of a dollar’s worth of a given policy. Therefore, a 
provision’s multiplier can be applied to the budgetary cost 
of that provision to estimate its overall impact on output. 
Direct effects consist of immediate (or first-round) effects 
on economic activity. Government purchases of goods 
and services directly add to the nation’s output on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis. For reductions in taxes, increases 
in transfer payments, and increases in aid to state and 
local governments, the size of the direct effect depends on 
the policy’s impact on the behavior of recipients. If some-
one receives a dollar in transfer payments and spends 
80 cents (saving the other 20 cents), production increases 
over time to meet the additional demand generated by 
that spending, and the direct impact on output is 
80 cents. Similarly, if a dollar in aid to a state government 
leads that government to spend 50 cents more on 
employees’ salaries (but causes no other changes in state 
spending or revenues, with the other 50 cents used to 
reduce borrowing or build up rainy-day funds), the direct 
impact on output is 50 cents.
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CBO reviewed evidence on the responses of households, 
businesses, and governments to various types of tax cuts 
and transfer payments to estimate the size of those poli-
cies’ direct effects on output.6 For example:
  A one-time cash payment is likely to have less impact 
on a household’s purchases than is a longer-lasting 
change to disposable income because the one-time 
payment has a smaller effect on total lifetime dispos-
able income. 
  Increases in disposable income are likely to boost pur-
chases more for lower-income than for higher-income 
households. That difference arises, at least in part, 
because a larger share of people in lower-income 
households cannot borrow as much money as they 
would wish in order to spend more than they do cur-
rently. 
  Changes to corporate taxes that primarily affect after-
tax profits on past investment generally have a smaller 
impact on output than do policies that alter the return 
from new investment. 
Government policies also can have indirect effects that 
enhance or offset the direct effects. Direct effects are 
enhanced when, for example, a government policy creates 
jobs and those who are hired use their income to 
boost consumption. Direct effects also are enhanced 
when greater demand for goods and services prompts 
companies to increase investment to bolster their future 
production. 
In the other direction, substantial government spending 
can cause a shift in resources (including employees) 
away from production in other businesses and sectors to 
government-funded projects. That indirect crowding-out 
effect could cause growth in employment among 
recipients of ARRA funding to be offset by declines in 
employment elsewhere in the economy. Increases in inter-
est rates are one possible mechanism for such crowding 
out: Higher interest rates discourage spending on invest-
ment and on durable goods such as cars because they raise 
the cost of borrowing. However, because the Federal 
Reserve has kept short-term interest rates very low, that 
mechanism does not appear to have been an important 
factor through the second quarter of 2011. By another 
mechanism for crowding out, activities funded by ARRA 
could reduce production elsewhere in the economy if 
they used scarce materials or workers with specific skills, 
creating bottlenecks that hindered other activities. That 
effect, too, was probably much smaller in the past two 
years than it might have been otherwise because of high 
unemployment and a large amount of unused resources 
(as well as the diversity of activities funded under ARRA). 
In estimating the magnitude of indirect effects, CBO 
relied heavily on estimates from macroeconometric fore-
casting models, informed by evidence from other types of 
models and from direct estimation using historical data. 
(For more details about those sources of information, see 
the appendix.)
CBO grouped the provisions of ARRA into general cate-
gories and assigned high and low multipliers to each. The 
ranges between high and low were chosen judgmentally 
to encompass most economists’ views about the direct 
and indirect effects of different policies. The multipliers 
indicate the cumulative impact of policies on GDP over 
several quarters, and they should be understood to apply 
to periods when the Federal Reserve is holding short-term 
interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus, 
as over the past two years. For instance, CBO estimates 
that a one-time increase of $1 in federal purchases of 
goods and services in one calendar quarter last year raised 
GDP above what it would have been otherwise by a total 
of $1 to $2.50 over several quarters. That cumulative 
multiplier of $2.50 at the high end of the range com-
prises increases in GDP of roughly $1.45 in the quarter 
when the federal spending occurred, roughly 60 cents 
in the following quarter, and roughly 45 cents in later 
quarters combined. By the end of 2015, when monetary 
policy is assumed to be fully responsive to fiscal stimulus, 
the estimated multipliers would be reduced by two-thirds.
The multipliers are applied to outlays when they occur 
and to changes in taxes or transfer payments when they 
affect disposable income. CBO’s estimates, therefore, 
6. On household spending, for example, see Jonathan A. Parker 
and others, Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus 
Payments of 2008, Working Paper 16684 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2011); Matthew 
D. Shapiro and Joel Slemrod, “Did the 2008 Tax Rebates Stimu-
late Spending?” American Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (May 
2009), pp. 374–379; Sumit Agarwal, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas 
S. Souleles, “The Reaction of Consumer Spending and Debt to 
Tax Rebates: Evidence from Consumer Credit Data,” Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 6 (December 2007), pp. 986–
1019; and David S. Johnson, Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. 
Souleles, “Household Expenditure and the Income Tax Rebates of 
2001,” American Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 5 (December 
2006), pp. 1589–1610.
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Table 2.
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
Continued
account for the different rates of spending for various 
types of appropriations and, similarly, for the timing of 
different tax cuts or transfer payments. In some cases, 
when different elements of a single provision were esti-
mated to have different multipliers, the total cost of a 
provision was divided among more than one category. 
In those cases, the provision is shown in Table 2 in the 
category to which most of its budgetary cost applied. 
Provisions that affect outlays (including refundable tax 
credits) are identified by the same names used in CBO’s 
cost estimate for the conference agreement on ARRA.7 
Provisions that affect revenues are identified by the names 
used in the revenue estimate prepared by the staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation for the same legislation.8
The ranges for multipliers in Table 2 are unchanged from 
those that CBO has used in its analysis of the economic 
effects of ARRA since early 2010. Although CBO has
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Purchases of Goods and Services 1.0 2.5 Division A, Title II: Other; Title IV: Energy Efficiency and
by the Federal Government Renewable Energy; Title IV: Innovative Technology Loan
Guarantee Program; Title IV: Other Energy Programs; Title V: 
Federal Buildings Fund; Title VIII: National Institutes of Health;
Title VIII: Other Department of Health and Human Services
Transfer Payments to State and 1.0 2.5 Division A, Title VII: Clean Water and Drinking Water State 
Local Governments for Revolving Funds; Title XI: Other Housing Assistance; Title XII: 
Infrastructure Highway Construction; Title XII: Other Transportation 
Transfer Payments to State and 0.7 1.8 Division A, Title VIII: Education for the Disadvantaged; Title 
Local Governments for Other VIII: Special Education; Title IX: State Fiscal Stabilization Fund; 
Purposes Division B, Title V: State Fiscal Relief Fund
Transfer Payments to Individuals 0.8 2.1 Division A, Title I: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program; 
Title VIII: Student Financial Assistance; Division B, Title I: 
Refundable Tax Credits;b Title II: Unemployment 
Compensation; Title III: Health Insurance Assistancec
One-Time Payments to Retirees 0.3 1.0 Division B, Title II: Economic Recovery Payments
Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- 0.6 1.5 Division B, Title I: Making Work Pay Credit;
and Middle-Income People American Opportunity Tax Credit
One-Year Tax Cut for Higher- 0.2 0.6 Increase in Individual AMT Exemption Amount
Income People
Extension of First-Time 0.3 0.8 Extension of First-Time Homebuyer Credit
Homebuyer Credit
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
7. See Congressional Budget Office, cost estimate for the conference 
agreement for H.R. 1, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (February 13, 2009).
8. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Budget Effects of 
the Revenue Provisions Contained in the Conference Agreement for 
H.R. 1, JCX-19-09 (February 12, 2009), www.jct.gov/x-19-
09.pdf. 
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Table 2. Continued
Estimated Output Multipliers of Major Provisions of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
Notes: Provisions affecting outlays (including refundable tax provisions) are identified by the same names used in CBO’s cost estimate for 
the conference report on H.R. 1. Provisions affecting revenues—all of which are included in Title I of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA)—are identified by the names used in the Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT’s) estimate (see 
www.house.gov/jct/x-19-09.pdf).
Some provisions include individual elements that have different multipliers, by CBO’s estimate; in those cases, the provisions are listed 
with the multiplier used for the majority of the 2009–2019 budgetary cost.
The economic impact of three tax provisions with budgetary costs over $5 billion was analyzed using a different methodology, and 
their effects cannot easily be summarized by a multiplier. Those provisions were titled “Extend by Three Years the Placed-In-Service 
Date for Each Section 45 Qualified Facility” and “One-Year Extension of Special Allowance for Certain Property Acquired During 2009” 
in JCT’s estimate and “Health Information Technology” in CBO’s estimate. Some other provisions, with total budgetary costs of less 
than $7 billion, were included in the analysis but are not shown in the table.
AMT = alternative minimum tax.
a. The output multiplier is the cumulative impact of spending under the provisions on gross domestic product over several quarters. The 
ranges shown in the table assume that the Federal Reserve is holding short-term interest rates about as low as possible and would not 
tighten monetary policy in response to a fiscal stimulus.
b. This provision was previously listed under “Two-Year Tax Cuts for Lower- and Middle-Income People,” but this report and CBO’s previous 
reports about ARRA have treated that provision as having the same economic impact as transfer payments to individuals.
c. This provision is a reduction in taxes, but it is treated as having the same economic impact as transfer payments to individuals.
continued to review research on the economic impact of 
various government policies—and some new research has 
emerged—CBO judges that the evidence, taken as a 
whole, continues to support roughly the same ranges for 
multipliers.
The estimates of ARRA’s effects on output were trans-
lated into estimates of the effects on the unemployment 
rate, total employment, and FTE employment in a series 
of steps. First, the impact on the output gap—the per-
centage difference between actual and potential output—
was calculated.9 Next, the effect of the change in the out-
put gap on the unemployment rate was estimated using 
the historical relationship between those two measures.10 
Then, the effect of changes in the unemployment rate on 
the labor force was taken into account: If unemployment 
declines and the economic environment improves, dis-
couraged workers and people who have chosen to pursue 
activities such as education rather than work will tend to 
return to the labor force. Together, the estimated effect 
on the unemployment rate and the effect on the labor 
force were used to estimate the impact on the number of 
people employed. The change in FTE employment was 
then estimated using the historical relationship between 
changes in hours per employed worker and changes in the 
Type of Activity Major Provisions of ARRA
Corporate Tax Provisions 0 0.4 Deferral and Ratable Inclusion of Income Arising from Business 
Primarily Affecting Cash Flow Indebtedness Discharged by the Reacquisition of a Debt 
Instrument; Clarification of Regulations Related to Limitations 
on Certain Built-In Losses Following an Ownership Change; 
Recovery Zone Bonds; Qualified School Construction Bonds 
Estimated Output Multipliersa
Low Estimate High Estimate
9. Potential output is the level of production that corresponds to a 
high rate of use of labor and capital. 
10. Changes in the output gap affect unemployment gradually over 
several quarters. Initially, part of a rise in output shows up as 
higher productivity and hours per worker rather than as reduced 
unemployment.
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gap between the unemployment rate and CBO’s estimate 
of the natural rate of unemployment.11 Because higher 
spending and lower taxes can affect output and un-
employment for some time after they occur, the impact
of ARRA on employment in the second quarter of 2011 
depended partly on the law’s effect on spending and 
revenues in previous years.
A key advantage of the model-based approach used in 
this analysis is the ability to provide estimates of the 
total effects throughout the economy of the government 
spending, transfer payments, and tax cuts resulting from 
ARRA. By focusing on the net change in employment, 
that approach captures both the jobs created and the jobs 
retained as a result of ARRA. 
A key disadvantage of the model-based approach is the 
considerable uncertainty about many of the economic 
relationships that are important in the modeling. Because 
economists differ on which analytical approaches provide 
the most convincing evidence about such relationships, 
they can reach different conclusions about those relation-
ships. In addition, each study involves uncertainty about 
the extent to which the results reflect the true effects of 
a given policy or the effects of other factors. For those 
reasons, CBO provides ranges of estimates of ARRA’s 
economic effects that are intended to encompass most 
economists’ views and thereby reflect the uncertainty 
involved in such estimates.
Change from CBO’s Previous Estimates of the 
Impact of ARRA 
The current estimates of the impact of ARRA on output 
in the second quarter of calendar year 2011 are slightly 
smaller than those presented in May 2011. Although 
CBO modestly increased its estimate of ARRA’s impact 
on federal spending in 2011 (mostly reflecting slightly 
higher estimates of outlays this year for energy efficiency 
and education programs), the agency also shifted esti-
mated federal spending by small amounts between quar-
ters of the year. 
The current estimates of the impact of ARRA on output 
and employment in 2012 are larger than those presented 
in May 2011. Although CBO slightly lowered its esti-
mate of ARRA’s impact on federal spending in 2012, the 
agency also changed its assumptions about future actions 
by the Federal Reserve. CBO now anticipates that the 
Federal Reserve will keep the federal funds rate close to 
zero through the fourth quarter of 2013, whereas previ-
ously, CBO had expected the Federal Reserve to begin 
raising the federal funds rate at the end of 2011. Under 
the prior assumption, the direct boost to the demand for 
goods and services provided by ARRA in 2012 would 
have been partly offset by slightly faster increases in inter-
est rates; under the current assumption, that dampening 
effect does not occur.
11. The natural rate of unemployment is the rate that arises from all 
sources except cyclical fluctuations in economywide demand for 
goods and services.
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Appendix: 
Evidence on the Economic Effects of Fiscal Stimulus
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) based 
its estimates of the economic effects of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) on 
information from various sources: macroeconometric 
forecasting models, general-equilibrium models, and 
direct extrapolations of past data. Macroeconometric 
forecasting models incorporate relationships among 
aggregate economic variables that are based largely on 
historical evidence. General-equilibrium models, by 
contrast, are built on explicit assumptions about the 
decisionmaking of individual people and businesses. 
Direct extrapolations of past data are generally based on 
correlations among economic variables in the past or 
on the effects of specific types of policy events in the 
past.1
Macroeconometric Forecasting Models
In analyzing ARRA’s economic effects, CBO drew heavily 
on versions of the commercial forecasting models of two 
economic consulting firms, Macroeconomic Advisors 
and Global Insight, and on the FRB-US model used at 
the Federal Reserve Board. Those models assume that 
the economy has an underlying potential output deter-
mined by the size of the labor supply, the capital stock, 
and technology. They also assume that actual output can 
change relative to potential output because of shifts in 
aggregate demand for goods and services from house-
holds, businesses, and the government. With those basic 
assumptions, the details of interactions among economic 
variables in the models are based largely on historical rela-
tionships, informed by theories of how those variables are 
determined (for example, the theory that total consump-
tion depends mostly on disposable income, wealth, and 
interest rates).2 Because they emphasize the influence of 
aggregate demand on output in the short run, the macro-
econometric forecasting models tend to predict greater 
economic effects from demand-enhancing policies such 
as ARRA than some other types of models do.
Macroeconometric forecasting models of this sort are 
used widely, and they underlie most of the forecasts 
offered to the clients of economic consulting firms. In 
addition, the models that CBO uses generally produce 
results that are roughly in line with the consensus of 
private-sector forecasters, as compiled in the Blue Chip 
Economic Indicators. However, some analysts criticize this 
sort of model for being based on historical relationships 
among aggregate economic variables, such as income and 
consumption, rather than being built up from clearly 
specified rules governing the behavior of households and 
businesses. In particular, some critics argue that models 
based on historical relationships will not provide accurate 
predictions in the face of new policies or new circum-
stances. Partly to address that concern, CBO presents a 
range of possible effects rather than a single number for 
each economic variable.
To reflect current economic conditions—in which there 
is considerable uncertainty about the financial and eco-
nomic outlook and in which short-term interest rates are 
low and are expected to remain so for some time—CBO 
altered the models’ usual formulation to reduce the extent 
to which interest rates respond to increases in output.3 
Under more normal economic conditions, higher interest 
rates would offset roughly two-thirds of the cumulative 
impact of stimulative policies on gross domestic product 
over two years.4 
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General-Equilibrium Models 
Some skeptics of the efficacy of stimulus have cited the 
results of an alternative class of models, which tend to 
imply more modest economic effects from such policies. 
In those models, people are assumed to make decisions 
about how much to work, buy, and save on the basis of 
current and expected future values of the wage rate, inter-
est rates, taxes, and government purchases, among other 
things. In the basic form of such models, stimulative 
policies tend to crowd out a significant amount of other 
economic activity, and multipliers tend to be less than 
1—meaning that such policies have less than a dollar-for-
dollar impact on output.
Some analysts favor the rigor of that approach to model-
ing behavior; however, for several reasons, others view 
this class of models as not well-suited to analyze the 
effects of countercyclical fiscal policy. In particular, this 
class of model does not typically incorporate involuntary 
unemployment: In such models, people can work as 
many hours as they choose at the wage rate determined 
by the market. In addition, this type of model is generally 
predicated on the assumption that people are fully ratio-
nal and forward-looking, basing their current decisions 
on a full lifetime plan. The extreme version of the 
forward-looking assumption implies that people expect 
eventually to pay for any increased government spending 
or reduced revenues in the form of tax increases and that 
they incorporate those expected payments—even if 
beyond their own lifetimes—into their current spending 
plans. Thus, they are assumed to curtail their consump-
tion when government spending rises because their life-
time income and that of their heirs have fallen by the 
amount of the eventual taxes. For the same reason, in 
such models, cash transfer payments and tax refunds have 
little or no effect on current consumption. People also are 
generally assumed to have full access to credit markets, so 
they can borrow to maintain consumption in the face of a 
temporary loss of income. Finally, in these models, mone-
tary policy often follows the rule that increased output or 
inflation implies higher inflation-adjusted interest rates, 
an assumption that does not correspond to current condi-
tions, in which interest rates are low and expected to 
remain so for some time. 
Recent research has shown that relaxing some of those 
modeling assumptions can result in much higher 
multipliers.5 CBO has incorporated the results of that 
research into its view of the effects of government poli-
cies. However, the research results appear to be too 
dependent on particular assumptions for CBO to rely on 
them heavily.
Extrapolations from Historical Data 
Another type of research uses historical data to directly 
project how government policies will affect the economy 
on the basis of how economic variables such as output 
and consumption have behaved in the past relative to 
government spending and revenues. However, estimates 
of economic effects from this research vary widely and are 
sensitive to the period and estimation strategy used.6 
Many estimates of this sort suggest that crowding-out 
effects dominate in the case of government purchases so 
that the impact on output tends to be less than one-for-
one and tends to diminish over time. Some estimates, 
however, suggest multipliers higher than the range esti-
mated by CBO. Multipliers for tax cuts are generally 
estimated to be higher than those for spending and to 
grow over time.7 
One pitfall of this approach is that the direction of causa-
tion between policies and the economy is not always 
clear. For example, poor economic conditions can 
prompt the government to enact policies such as ARRA 
in an effort to boost economic activity. If weak economic 
performance led to such a policy, it would not be accurate 
to ascribe that performance to the policy, rather than vice 
versa. Likewise, if states and localities reduced purchases 
and laid employees off when their budgets deteriorated 
in a recession, it would not be accurate to blame the 
recession on the cuts in government spending. When 
causation runs in both directions in this way, the histori-
cal correlation between variables is not always the best 
guide for predicting the effects of a new policy proposal.
One strategy that has been applied to overcome that 
obstacle is to try to isolate the economic impact of spe-
cific policies that are arguably unrelated to economic 
conditions. One such policy is spending during wartime, 
which is driven by national security concerns rather than 
economic conditions.8 However, the effects of additional 
federal spending during wars might not be indicative 
of the effects of increases in federal spending at other 
times. For example, during World War II, the rationing 
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of many goods might have reduced the indirect effects of 
government spending on private consumption and 
investment.9 Another such policy is federal spending that 
is allocated across states on the basis of criteria other than 
states’ economic conditions. Examples include federal 
outlays for the military and grants provided through 
ARRA.10 However, using the cross-state variation in fed-
eral spending to estimate the effects of that spending on 
state economies misses two potentially important effects: 
spillovers from recipient states to other states (such 
as shifts in resources from other states or increases in 
demand for output from other states) and any crowding 
out of investment owing to nationwide increases in inter-
est rates. 
More generally, most studies based on historical evidence 
estimate the effects of policies under average economic 
conditions. Under current conditions—in which interest 
rates are apt to be less affected than usual by expansionary 
government policies and in which there are large amounts 
of idle resources—the effects would probably be greater 
than they were, on average, in the past.11 
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